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Just Click Here:  Article 2B’s Failure to 
Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of 
Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts 
907 
Zachary M. Harrison* 
On the information highway lots of product information will be 
available directly from the manufacturers.  As they do today, ven-
dors will use a variety of entertaining and provocative techniques 
to attract us. 
—Bill Gates1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself browsing the Internet, looking to download 
software to play classical music off the World Wide Web.2  You 
are delighted to find a vendor selling a reasonably priced program 
that does what you want.3  So you input your name, address, e-mail 
address, and credit card number, and the opening page of a multi-
page license agreement pops up on the screen.4  Hovering below it 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University School of Law.  The author thanks 
Heath B. Zarin and Tara J. Goldsmith for their insight and guidance. 
1. BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 159 (1995). 
2. See Tim Blangger, Music to Your Ears; Download the latest records at home for 
a price, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1998, at C3 (reporting on the availability of downloadable 
music and music player software on the Internet); see also William M. Bulkeley, Radio 
Stations Make Waves on the Web, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1998, at B1 (reporting on the 
growth of Internet radio broadcasting, which is available to listeners through download-
able music-reproduction software); cf. Paul Gilster, Internet becoming regular interstate 
for audio traffic, NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh, N.C.), June 7, 1998, at E12 (evaluating 
several of the programs available for listening to online broadcasts). 
3. As of July 1998, at least “five million software [music] ‘players’ in one music 
format, MP3, ha[d] been downloaded” from the Internet.  Jon Pareles, Digital Distribu-
tion Of Music Is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at E2 (reporting that “anyone with 
a mid-level computer and an Internet connection can hear music in a multitude of 
forms”). 
4. Such on-line licensing agreements are known as “click-wrap” licenses.  See Hot-
mail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98-20064, 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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are two large hyperlinks that read “I Accept” and “I Do Not Ac-
cept.”5  You are so eager to download the program that you click 
on “I Accept” without scrolling through the full agreement.6  
That’s when the trouble begins.  The software vendor inadvertently 
transmits a virus that infects your system and blocks access to your 
hard drive.7  You seek repair costs from the vendor and are stunned 
to learn that the “click-wrap”8 license that you failed to read on-
screen disclaimed all vendor liability for viruses. 
As Internet use has grown dramatically in recent years, so too 
has the use of click-wrap licensing9—for both on-line and retail 
sales of software.10  Click-wrap contracting involves the text of an 
 
1020 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (order) (issuing preliminary injunction to enforce, 
inter alia, a click-wrap license agreement).  Hotmail is billed as “the first judicial pro-
nouncement” on the enforceability of click-wrap contracts.  Martin H. Samson, Outside 
Counsel:  Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1998, at 1. 
5. Click-wrap agreements operate without paper: 
A party posts terms on its [Internet] Web site pursuant to which it offers to sell 
goods or services.  To buy these goods, the purchaser is required to [manifest] 
his assent to be bound by the terms of the offer by his conduct—typically the 
act of clicking on a button stating “I agree.”  Once the purchaser indicates his 
assent to be bound, the contract is formed on the posted terms, and the sale is 
consummated. 
Samson, supra note 4. 
6. See id. 
7. Cf. Glyn Moody, Build up your immunity to viruses over the Net, COMPUTER 
WEEKLY, Sept. 4, 1997, at 46 (reporting on the widespread fear of Internet computer vi-
ruses and the elaborate precautions against them).  But cf. Glyn Moody, Virus talk gives 
users the wrong impression, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Aug. 28, 1997, at 32 (downplaying 
widespread fears of computer viruses on the Internet). 
8. See Adam Eric Jaffe, Note, Red Alert!  Add-On Games Are Coming!, 8 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 655, 693 (1998) (full text of sample click-wrap license 
agreement).  Click-wrap licenses operate in the same manner as the shrink-wrap agree-
ments common to software packaging, except that a click-wrap license is accepted by a 
using a computer mouse, rather than by opening a sealed software package.  See id. at 
689 n.232; cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing provi-
sions of a shrink-wrap license); cf. also William A. Streff, Jr. & Jeffrey S. Norman, 
Courts, UCC Tackle Shrink-Wrap Licenses, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 1997, at S6 (reporting, 
inter alia, that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
the American Law Institute has proposed and sponsored a new provision to the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) dealing with shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and electronic li-
censes). 
9. See Streff & Norman, supra note 8 (reporting that “[t]he use of shrink-wrap and 
click-wrap licensing has become common practice in the sale of retail software”). 
10. See, e.g., Diane W. Savage, The Impact of Proposed Article 2B of the Uniform 
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offer for computer software, presented on a computer screen along 
with the license terms.11  A computer user manifests his acceptance 
of the offer by clicking an on-screen box, which states that the user 
accepts the terms of the license.12  Click-wrap licenses enable li-
censors to protect information that would be otherwise permissible 
to copy under the federal and international intellectual property 
laws; licensors also use the click-wrap system to disclaim implied 
warranties and consequential damages.13 
Through click-wrap terms, software vendors attempt to use 
contract law to limit the rights of purchasers under intellectual 
property law, while simultaneously enhancing their own rights.14  
If enforceable, click-wrap terms can effectively shield an on-line 
 
Commercial Code on Consumer Contracts for Information and Computer Software, 9 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 251, 254 (1997) (discussing the growth of subscriptions to on-
line services and electronic commerce). 
11. See Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinking and Click-On Licenses Af-
ter ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (1996). 
12. See Marcus G. Larson, Applying Uniform Sales Law to International Software 
Transactions:  The Use of the CISG, Its Shortcomings, and a Comparative Look at How 
the Proposed UCC Article 2B Would Remedy Them, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 482 
(1997). 
13. See Streff & Norman, supra note 8; see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property and Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley 
I] (describing the purposes of shrink-wrap licenses as providing proprietary rights, limit-
ing warranties, and limiting user rights).  The opening text of a typical click-wrap agree-
ment provides as follows: 
ONLINE SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT IMPORTANT! 
The Software you seek to download from the [Vendor] website (“Website”) is 
licensed only on the condition that you (referred to as “YOU” or 
“CUSTOMER”) agrees with [VENDOR] (referred to as “VENDOR”) to the 
terms and conditions set forth below.  PLEASE CAREFULLY READ THE 
TERMS OF THIS SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT. 
IF YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, 
YOU SHOULD CLICK ON THE BOX AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE 
LABELED “I ACCEPT” AT WHICH TIME THE SOFTWARE WILL BE 
DOWNLOADED TO YOUR COMPUTER. 
IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOU 
SHOULD CLICK ON THE BOX AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE 
LABELED “I DO NOT ACCEPT” AT WHICH POINT YOU WILL RETURN 
TO THE PRIOR WEB PAGE WITHOUT THE SOFTWARE BEING 
DOWNLOADED. 
Michael D. Scott, Protecting Software Transactions On-line:  The Use of “Clickwrap” 
Licenses, 482 PLI/PAT. 101, 113 (1997). 
14. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1239-40. 
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software transaction from rights given the user by intellectual 
property law.15  Recurring provisions in shrink-wrap and click-
wrap licenses include proprietary rights, limitations on warranties, 
and limitations on user rights.16 
Proprietary rights provisions typically assert that the informa-
tion contained in the accompanying computer software is proprie-
tary to the vendor and cannot be copied or disclosed without the 
vendor’s permission.17  Warranty limitations typically disclaim 
implied contractual warranties such as the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.18  Typically, 
licenses with such limitations also disclaim all liability for conse-
quential, incidental, special, or exemplary damages.19  Those dis-
claimers are important, given the significant damages that a user 
might suffer if a program crashes or a computer virus is transmit-
ted on-line.20 
Wrap licenses typically prevent a user from selling or other-
wise disposing of her particular copy of software.21  This conflicts 
with section 117 of the Copyright Act,22 which expressly grants 
owners of a copy of a computer program the right to make archival 
copies and to adapt the computer program as necessary to make 
sure it runs on the computer.23  A wrap term also may limit a user’s 
right to “decompile or disassemble” the program for any purpose.24  
Such a limitation conflicts with the rule followed by a majority of 
jurisdictions, which enables users to “reverse engineer” computer 
programs when necessary to gain access to unprotected ideas con-
tained in those programs.25  Wrap licenses also may prohibit copy-
 
15. See id. at 1245-46. 
16. See id. at 1242-48. 
17. See id. at 1242. 
18. See id. at 1245. 
19. See id. 
20. See Woody Leonhard, Virus Attack!, PC-COMPUTING, May 1, 1997 (stating that 
viruses cost the typical company $8,100 in lost time and productivity in 1996). 
21. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1246. 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). 
23. See Lemley I, supra note 13; see also infra note 103 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117). 
24. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1247. 
25. See id. (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992), as 
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 
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ing all or part of a computer program even when such copying 
would constitute a “fair use” of the copyrighted material pursuant 
to section 107 of the Copyright Act.26 
Another term that commonly appears in wrap agreements is a 
forum selection clause.27  Such a provision is used by the licensor 
to bring certainty to an Internet information-based transaction that 
lacks any fixed geographical location.28  Under the proposed article 
2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), forum selection 
clauses are enforceable unless the chosen jurisdiction would not 
otherwise have jurisdiction over the consumer and the choice is 
“unreasonable and unjust” to the consumer.29 
Currently in its drafting stages, article 2B of the U.C.C. is de-
signed to create an enforceable set of rules for shrink-wrap agree-
 
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
26. Id. at 1247 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1996)).  Specifically, section 
107 states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonore-
cords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include— 
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C.A. § 107. 
27. See Savage, supra note 10, at 256. 
28. See id. 
29. U.C.C. § 2B-109 (Draft Sept. 25, 1997).  Specifically, the proposed 2B-109 
provides: 
The parties may choose an exclusive forum.  However, [other than in an access 
contract for informational content or services,] in a consumer contract the 
choice is not enforceable if the chosen jurisdiction would not otherwise have 
jurisdiction over the consumer.  A choice-of-forum term is not exclusive unless 
the agreement expressly so provides. 
Id. 
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ments and other electronic licensing arrangements, including click-
wrap agreements.30  In a retail context, a typical click-wrap license 
comes in the form of a notice appearing on a user’s screen during 
the installation process that posts the terms and conditions under 
which the product is offered, and enables the user to click on either 
“accept” or “decline.”31  On the Internet, web sites enable users to 
download software subject to the terms and conditions of elec-
tronically transmitted licenses.  Once again, the purchaser is typi-
cally presented with the choice of clicking either “accept” or “de-
cline.” 
The term click-wrap is derived from its similarity to shrink-
wrap licenses or agreements sealed in plastic on the outside of 
computer software when purchased.32  Under both types of license, 
the software licensor does not receive a signed agreement from the 
user, and instead relies on the consumer’s manifestation of assent 
via the computer.33  Until recently, the enforceability of shrink-
wrap and click-wrap agreements was uncertain.34  The few cases 
that addressed the issue of both shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
agreements involved fact-specific rulings highly dependent on the 
contractual circumstances prior to the licensee’s awareness of the 
wrap terms.35  But two cases may signal a change in the way the 
electronic licenses are generally viewed.  In ProCD, Inc. v. Zei-
denberg,36 the Seventh Circuit ruled a shrink-wrap license enforce-
able even where the licensed information was not protected by 
 
30. See id. § 2B-101 n. 2. 
31. See Scott, supra note 13 (containing portion of a typical license agreement). 
32. See Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright:  Enforceability of Shrinkwrap 
Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 571 (1997) (describing the typical shrink-
wrap licensing agreement as “a single piece of paper containing the license terms 
wrapped in cellophane or transparent plastic along with the computer software installa-
tion diskettes or the owner’s manual”). 
33. See infra notes 171-191 (discussing section 2B-212’s manifestation of assent 
provision). 
34. See Rebecca S. Eisner, Managing Customer Relationships and Avoiding Liabili-
ties on the Internet, 491 PLI/PAT. 205, 236-37 (1997). 
35. See infra notes 87-88, 90-91, 103-104 and accompanying text (stating the hold-
ings of Step-Saver, Arizona Retail, and Vault); cf. Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet:  
Developing a Framework for Making New Law, 482 PLI/PAT. 9, 24 (1997) (noting that 
“Internet disputes have generated numerous unreported decisions, but little binding 
precedent”). 
36. 86 F.3d 1477 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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copyright.37  More recently, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, 
Inc.,38 a trial court issued a preliminary injunction, in part, to en-
force the provisions of a click-wrap license.39  Those rulings lend 
impetus to the proposals to amend the U.C.C. to deal with elec-
tronic wrap licensing. 
This Note focuses on those current proposals to amend the 
U.C.C. through article 2B, and the challenge of creating a contract 
regime in which click-wrap agreements are enforceable and the 
consumer’s rights are protected.  Part I explores general contract 
principles applicable to click-wrap agreements and recent case law 
that addresses the enforceability of wrap agreements, culminating 
with the Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg.  Part II examines the September 1997 draft of article 
2B and its provisions most applicable to click-wrap contracts.  Part 
III addresses consumer manifestation of assent to click-wrap terms, 
suggests deficiencies in article 2B’s current form with respect to 
protecting licensees, and offers means of enhancing the con-
sumer’s psychological commitment to assent.  This Note concludes 
that article 2B should be amended to require additional safeguards 
for consumers faced with click-wrap terms in order to achieve 
greater industry-consumer balance. 
I. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF “WRAP” AGREEMENTS PRIOR TO THE 
PROCD DECISION 
Click-wrap agreements do not fit neatly within the bargain the-
ory of contract formation envisioned by the Second Restatement of 
Contracts.40  Therefore, article 2B is necessary to clarify the rights 
 
37. Id.; see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the arbitration clause included with a personal computer was enforceable, and 
deemed accepted, because the plaintiffs failed to return the computer within the thirty day 
limit set forth in the contract). 
38. No. C-98-20064, 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
16, 1998) (order). 
39. Id. at *6. 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); see Lemley I, supra note 
13, at 1248-49.  Specifically, section 71 of the Restatement sets forth the following:  “(1) 
to constitute consideration, a performance or return promise must be bargained for.  (2) A 
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange 
for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”  
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and obligations of the parties to such transactions.  Under current 
practices, the parties to a click-wrap agreement do not engage in a 
bargain over the license terms.  In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit’s 
disagreement with the trial court turned largely on the level of re-
view the vendee should be afforded in a contract where a bargain is 
absent41—an issue that also arose in the few fact-specific rulings 
on the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses prior to ProCD.  The 
common law of contracts and limited precedent provide a founda-
tion for critiquing the efficacy of the proposed article 2B. 
A. Common Law Contract Principles Applied to Click-Wrap 
License Agreements 
A contract is a promise or set of promises that the law will en-
force in some manner.42  Contract law requires three elements in 
order to effect a binding contract:  offer, acceptance, and consid-
eration.43  The offer serves as a promise:  a commitment to do or 
refrain from doing something in the future.44  An offer creates the 
power of acceptance in the offeree, enabling him to turn the of-
feror’s promise into a contractual obligation.45  An offer is a mani-
festation of assent to enter into a bargain made by the offeror, con-
ditional on assent by the offeree.46  The offeree’s assent may take 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1)-(2) (1981). 
41. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (1997). 
42. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, § 1.1, at 4 (1990); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as “a 
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”). 
43. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1248; see also Jenkins v. County of Schuylkill, 
441 Pa. Super. 642, 648, 658 A.2d 380, 383 (1995) (noting “[i]t is black letter law that in 
order to form an enforceable contract, there must be an offer, acceptance, consideration 
or mutual meeting of the minds”); Hyman Farm Serv., Inc. v. Earth Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 
920 S.W.2d 452, 457 (1996) (holding buyer’s agreement to pay federal excise taxes on 
fuel purchased from seller not a binding contract based on seller’s failure to prove “[t]he 
requisites for contractual formation:  an offer, acceptance of that offer, and considera-
tion”). 
44. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-5, at 
31 (3d ed. 1987); see also Day v. Amax, 701 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing the 
function of an offer in a bargain). 
45. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, at 32; see also League Gen. Ins. Co. 
v. Tvedt, 317 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1982) (discussing the function of acceptance). 
46. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 163; see also RESTATEMENT 
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the form of a return promise or act.47 
Traditional contract law envisions contract formation only after 
the parties have bargained over the terms.48  Mass-market click-
wrap transactions, however, typically lack any bargaining between 
the vendor and user with respect to license terms.49  Essentially, 
such transactions are “take it or leave it” agreements in which the 
user is not made aware of the terms, if at all, until late in the trans-
action.50  Unlike traditional written contracts for the sale of goods 
or services, the party against whom the terms will be enforced in a 
click-wrap agreement never signs the license.51 
A retail advertisement for the sale of goods may or may not 
constitute an offer—depending on its level of specificity.  Typi-
cally, a reasonable person standard is used.52  It has long been es-
tablished that an advertisement placed by a clothing store for a 
brand of suits sold for $250 does not constitute an offer because it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the merchant has committed 
itself to reserve an unlimited supply of suits.53  This problem could 
arise in the Internet context if an on-line service provider adver-
tised its services for a very low price.  By doing so, it would be 
 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (defining an offer as “the manifestation of willingness to 
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it”).  See, e.g., Eerdmans v. Maki, 573 
N.W.2d 329, 332 (1997) (holding that listing agreement between a real estate agent and 
property owner did not manifest a willingness on the part of the owner to enter into a 
bargain with a prospective purchaser). 
47. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 163. 
48. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of a bargain 
between the parties to a contract). 
49. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1249. 
50. Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 317 
(1995) [hereinafter Lemley II]. 
51. See Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1249. 
52. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, § 2.6, at 37; see also Jackson v. In-
vestment Corp. of Palm Beach, 585 So.2d 949, 950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 1 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS ' 94, 339-340 (“[T]he test of the true interpretation of an offer 
or acceptance is not what the party making it thought it meant or intended it to mean, but 
what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant.”)). 
53. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, § 2.6, at 34-5; see also Georgian Co. 
v. Bloom, 108 S.E. 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921); Steinberg v. Chicago Med. School, 371 
N.E.2d 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Rhen Marshall, Inc. v. Purolator Filter Div., 318 N.W.2d 
284 (Neb. Ct. App. 1982). 
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pledging itself to handle only the number of orders a reasonable 
person would have anticipated and not an infinite number of or-
ders.54 
Acceptance can be defined as an action taken by the offeree 
through either a promise or performance that creates a contract.55  
The offeree’s acceptance makes the offeror’s promise legally en-
forceable.56  Agreements with certain classes of persons such as in-
fants or persons suffering from mental infirmity are either void, or 
more often, voidable.57 
Consideration, the traditional contractual requirement of either 
a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, has been 
replaced in the Second Restatement of Contracts by bargain the-
ory.58  Under the Second Restatement of Contracts, something is 
considered bargained for “if it is sought by the promisor in ex-
change for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange 
for that promise.”59 
A key issue in the common law of contracts that is especially 
relevant to determining the enforceability of click-wrap agree-
ments is whether assent should be determined on the basis of the 
parties’ actual or apparent intentions.60  The subjective approach 
looks to the actual intentions of the parties61 and is reflected in the 
Second Restatement of Contracts.62  In order for a contract to be 
formed under the subjective approach, there must be a “meeting of 
the minds” between the parties.63  Assent is binding only to those 
terms to which the parties have agreed in fact.64  The objective ap-
 
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable person 
standard applied to offer and acceptance based on advertisements). 
55. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 164; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (defining acceptance). 
56. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 164. 
57. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, § 8-2, at 306-07. 
58. See id. § 2.2, at 62-63. 
59. Id. at 63 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71). 
60. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 168. 
61. See id. 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 210, 212, 215, cmt. b (1981). 
63. FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 168. 
64. See Celeste L. Tito, The Servicewrap:  “Shrink-Wrap” for Mass-Marketed 
Software Services, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 19, 22 (1996). 
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proach, in contrast, looks to the external or objective appearance of 
the parties’ intentions as manifested by their actions.65  If the par-
ties’ actions, based on a standard of reasonableness, manifest an 
intention to agree, the parties’ real but unexpressed states of mind 
are irrelevant.66  In its current form, U.C.C. article 2B’s approach 
to wrap agreements strongly reflects the objective approach.67 
It is well established that a party, who has the capacity to un-
derstand a written document but fails to read it before signing it, is 
bound by the signature.68  An exception to this duty to read arises 
where the provisions are not sufficiently called to the attention of 
the party.69  Whether a contractual provision is sufficiently called 
to the attention of a party is determined by whether a reasonable 
person, considering all the circumstances of the case, would know 
that the terms in question would be a part of the proposed con-
tract.70  With adhesion contracts, courts also have declined to im-
pose a duty to read rule if the term or terms buried in the contract 
are either unconscionable or contrary to public policy.71  It is un-
clear whether the duty to read would apply in the click-wrap con-
text because inexperienced users may not be aware that the addi-
tional wrap terms are binding.72 
A model example of post-sale terms in a context outside elec-
tronic contracting is the additional terms attached to the back of a 
cruise ship ticket as discussed in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute.73  In Carnival, the Shutes, a Washington State couple, filed 
suit against Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”), a Florida-
based company, in the Western District of Washington for injuries 
suffered by Mrs. Shute when she slipped on a deck mat on Carni-
 
65. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 42, § 3.6, at 168-69. 
66. See id. at 169. 
67. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing the objective and sub-
jective approaches under article 2B). 
68. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, § 9-42, at 410. 
69. See id. at 412. 
70. See id. at 413. 
71. See id. at 421. 
72. See infra notes 200-201 and accompanying text (discussing how article 2B’s 
reasonable person standard for conspicuous language is problematic when applied to 
computer users because their computer knowledge varies greatly). 
73. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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val’s cruise ship off the coast of Mexico.74  The Washington Fed-
eral District Court granted Carnival summary judgment.75  The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Carnival’s forum selection 
clause on the back of the tickets was unenforceable because it was 
not freely bargained for and would effectively deprive the Shutes 
of their day in court in light of evidence they were incapable of 
pursuing the litigation in Florida.76  The Supreme Court reversed in 
a seven to two decision, holding the forum selection clause reason-
able and enforceable based on its effects of reducing litigation and 
insurance costs, as well as passenger fairs.77 
B. Shrink-Wraps Were Invalid Prior to ProCD 
Prior to ProCD,78 only three reported cases discussed the issue 
of the enforceability of wrap licenses.79  All three addressed the en-
forceability of shrink-wrap licenses.80  Although those decisions 
established some general principles to guide software developers 
and consumers, none of them involved a click-wrap agreement in a 
mass-market consumer transaction.81  The common issue to all of 
those cases was whether a licensee could be subject to post-sale li-
cense terms when those terms were either not completely displayed 
or not known to the purchaser until after the licensee had pur-
chased the program. 
 
74. See id. at 585. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 597. 
78. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
79. See infra notes 82, 89, 101 (citing Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech-
nology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. 
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993), and Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th 
Cir. 1988)). 
80. See infra notes 84, 97, 103 (discussing the shrink-wrap license at issue in Step-
Saver, Arizona Retail, and Vault). 
81. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 3; see also infra Part II.A (discussing 
the definitions of “mass-market license” and “mass-market transaction” in section 2B-
107(28) and section 2B-107(29) respectively). 
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1. Courts Finding Contract Formed Prior to Shipment 
With Shrink-Wrap Terms as Additional Terms 
In Step-Saver Data Systems Inc. v. Wyse Technology and Soft-
ware Link, Inc.,82 the plaintiff purchaser contested the enforceabil-
ity of terms contained in a shrink-wrap license received from the 
defendant Wyse Technology and Software Link, Inc. (“Wyse”).83  
In a series of telephone orders, Wyse agreed to ship software at an 
agreed-upon price; the parties did not discuss the shrink-wrap li-
cense.84  Wyse nevertheless included a shrink-wrap license in each 
shipment of the software and petitioned the court to enforce the 
terms of the license.85  The Third Circuit, applying section 2-207 
of the U.C.C.,86 held that the shrink-wrap license was not part of 
the contract established between the parties.87  In reaching its con-
clusion, the court emphasized that Wyse “did not clearly express 
its unwillingness to proceed with the transactions unless its addi-
tional [shrink-wrap license] terms were incorporated into the par-
ties’ agreement.”88 
In Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,89 the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona followed 
 
82. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
83. Id. at 102-03. 
84. Id. at 97. 
85. Id. at 103. 
86. Section 2-207(2) provides, in relevant part: 
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the con-
tract.  Between merchants such terms become a part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1991).  Official comment 4 of section 2-207 states: 
Examples of typical clauses which would normally “materially alter” the con-
tract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express 
awareness by the other party are:  a clause negating such standard warranties as 
that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in 
which either warranty normally attaches . . . . 
Id. § 2-207 cmt. 4. 
87. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105. 
88. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 3 (quoting Step-Saver Data Sys. Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 103 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
89. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
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Step-Saver.  The court concluded that a shrink-wrap license was 
not part of the contract established in a series of telephone orders 
in which neither party discussed the license or its terms.90  The 
court further held, however, that the shrink-wrap license was en-
forceable based on an initial transaction prior to the multiple tele-
phone orders.91 
In the initial transaction, the purchaser’s system manager tele-
phoned to inquire about a specific software program.92  The vendor 
Software Link, Inc. (“Software Link”) sent two copies of the soft-
ware, an “evaluative” copy and a “live” copy.93  Arizona Retail 
Systems spent two hours using the evaluative copy, determined it 
wanted to purchase the program, and then opened the live copy, 
which had the license attached to it.94  Subsequently, Arizona Re-
tail Systems purchased additional copies of the software through 
telephone orders.95 
The court considered the initial transaction separately from the 
subsequent transactions, finding that the initial offer took place 
when Software Link sent the live copy of the software with the 
evaluation diskette.96  The court held that Arizona Retail Systems 
accepted Software Link’s offer and entered into a contract when 
Arizona Retail Systems opened the “live disk” envelope, which 
expressly stated that, by opening the envelope, the user acknowl-
edged acceptance of the product and consented to all the provisions 
of the license agreement.97  The terms of the box-top license were 
incorporated into that contract because they were visible on the 
outside of the envelope and Arizona Retail Systems had been ex-
 
90. See id. at 764. 
91. See id. at 763. 
92. See id. at 760. 
93. See id. at 761.  An “evaluative” copy of software is a sample of the software 
program intended to enable the potential purchaser to evaluate the software prior to pur-
chase.  See Jeffrey C. Selman & Christopher S. Chen, Steering the Titanic Clear of the 
Iceberg:  Saving the Sale of Software from the Perils of Warranties, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 
531, 535 (1997).  A “live” copy of software is the complete software program with a li-
cense printed on shrink-wrap encasing the software.  Cf. id. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 764. 
97. See id. 
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posed to them before the contract was formed.98 
2. Shrink-Wrap Agreement Invalidated Based on Section 
117 Preemption of Louisiana State Law 
In addition to a developer’s failure to manifest intent not to 
proceed unless wrap terms are incorporated,99 click-wrap terms 
also may fail through preemption by federal law when they impede 
the user from engaging in activities authorized under federal copy-
right law.100  Preemption was at the heart of the only other reported 
case, prior to ProCD, that discussed the enforceability of shrink-
wrap licenses:  Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.101  In Vault, the 
defendant Quaid Software Ltd. (“Quaid”) reverse engineered soft-
ware diskettes manufactured by the plaintiff Vault Corp. 
(“Vault”).102  Clearly, that was the antithesis of the diskettes’ in-
tended purpose.  The Fifth Circuit found that Quaid’s activities in 
copying and reverse engineering Vault’s software were within the 
copying privileges granted under section 117 of the Copyright 
Act.103  Therefore, the court refused to enforce the contrary prohi-
 
98. See id. 
99. See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text (describing the holding of Step-
Saver). 
100. See Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution:  New 
Life for “Shrinkwrap” Licenses?, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 4-5 (1996).  But see ProCD Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Courts usually read preemption 
clauses to leave private contracts unaffected.”). 
101. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
102. See id. at 261. 
103. See id.  Section 117 of the Copyright Act states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the 
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of an-
other copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: 
    (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in 
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and 
that it is used in no other manner, or 
    (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and 
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful. 
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section 
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which 
such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all 
rights in the program.  Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with 
the authorization of the copyright owner. 
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bitions of Vault’s shrink-wrap license on the grounds of preemp-
tion by federal law.104  The court proceeded from the premise that 
the license was a “contract of adhesion” that would be invalid but 
for the provisions of Louisiana’s License Act, which provided that 
a software user was “deemed to have accepted” a shrink-wrap li-
cense if it accompanied the software in the manner prescribed by 
the statute and contained terms authorized by the statute.105 
3. The District Court and Seventh Circuit in ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg:  Competing Views on Consumer 
Consent to Wrap Terms 
Although courts and legislatures have yet to squarely confront 
click-wrap enforceability issues, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals did uphold the enforceability of a restriction in a click-wrap 
license agreement in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.106  Unlike the pre-
ceding cases, ProCD considered the enforceability of both click-
wrap and shrink-wrap licenses in a mass-market consumer 
transaction.  In ProCD, the licensor, had spent more than $10 mil-
lion compiling more than 3,000 publicly available telephone and 
address directories into a CD-ROM database.107  The shrink-wrap 
and click-wrap licenses included with the program provided that 
the data could be copied only for non-commercial purposes.108  
Zeidenberg, the defendant, purchased ProCD’s database and sub-
sequently resold the information over the Internet in violation of 
the click-wrap license terms.109  The license had been designed by 
ProCD to appear on the user’s screen when the program was first 
installed and required the user to click a button indicating his or 
her agreement to the displayed terms before proceeding.110 
 
17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 1996). 
104. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 261. 
105. Id. at 269. 
106. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
107. See id. at 1449. 
108. See id. at 1450. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 1452.  In its ProCD ruling, the Seventh Circuit noted that: 
ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software af-
ter having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.  This Zeidenberg did.  
He had no choice because the software splashed the license on the screen and 
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a. The Wisconsin District Court Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin granted Zeidenberg’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that ProCD’s shrink-wrap license was unenforceable be-
cause Zeidenberg did not consent to the terms on the interior of the 
package at the time of the purchase.111  In refusing to enforce the 
shrink-wrap license, the court rejected ProCD’s argument that the 
license, which was referenced on the outside of the box, should be 
part of the contract formed between ProCD and Zeidenberg.112  
The district court reasoned that “[m]ere reference to the terms at 
the time of initial contract formation does not present buyers an 
adequate opportunity to decide whether they are acceptable.  They 
must be able to read and consider the terms in their entirety.”113 
The court also discussed the proposed U.C.C. section 2-
2203,114 which would validate shrink-wrap licenses if the con-
sumer had an opportunity to review the terms of the license before 
manifesting assent.115  The court viewed this proposal as evidence 
that shrink-wrap licenses were invalid under the current U.C.C., 
reasoning that the proposed change would not be necessary if 
shrink-wrap licenses were valid.116  The court concluded that Zei-
denberg was not bound by the terms of ProCD’s shrink-wrap li-
cense.117 
 
would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance. 
Id. 
111. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
112. See id. at 654-55. 
113. Id. at 654. 
114. See id. at 655 (citing Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1293).  The proposed section 
2-2203 on which the district court based its ruling would have made standard form li-
censes enforceable if: 
[P]rior to or within a reasonable time after beginning to use the intangibles pur-
suant to an agreement, the party 
    (1) signs or otherwise by its behavior manifests assent to a standard 
form license; and 
    (2) had an opportunity to review the terms of the license before mani-
festing assent, whether or not it actually reviewed the terms. 
Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1293. 
115. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
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b. Reversal by the Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding with 
respect to the shrink-wrap license, holding that shrink-wrap li-
censes in mass-market consumer transactions are enforceable un-
der the U.C.C. “unless their terms are objectionable on grounds 
applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a 
rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).”118  The Sev-
enth Circuit disregarded Step-Saver119 as merely a battle-of-the-
forms case, and proceeded to determine that the ProCD license 
agreement was enforceable.120  The court found that the contract 
was formed when the purchaser agreed to the license that was dis-
played on the screen.121  The court reasoned that although contracts 
are frequently formed by simply paying and walking out of the 
store, ProCD’s sale was expressly subject to a license agree-
ment.122 
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that parties are free to “struc-
ture their relations so that the buyer has a chance to make a final 
decision after a detailed review” of the license agreement.123  Un-
der the court’s rationale, Zeidenberg could have prevented formu-
lation of the contract pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-201(1),124 sim-
 
118. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).  The weight of 
the Seventh Circuit’s reversal has been brought in question recently by the proposed 
Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act.  The Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act 
would preempt non-negotiable contracts that attempt to limit the use of non-copyrighted 
material and non-negotiable licenses that attempt to restrict a user’s right to use copy-
righted work in ways permitted under Copyright Act provisions.  See David L. Loundy, 
The Good, Bad, Ugly of Copyright Law Rewrites, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 8, 1998, at 5. 
119. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing Step-Saver Data 
Systems Inc. v. Wyse Technology and Software Link, Inc., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
120. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 1450. 
123. Id. at 1453. 
124. According to section 2-201(1): 
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for 
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless 
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker.  A writing is not insufficient be-
cause it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not 
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
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ply by returning the software after he found any objectionable 
terms in the click-wrap agreement.125  The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that it is fair to enforce the terms of the shrink-wrap license 
as long as basic protections are provided to the consumer:  notice 
of the existence of the shrink-wrap license, opportunity to review 
and reject the license, and an available refund if the license is not 
acceptable.126 
4. Step-Saver, Arizona Retail, Vault and ProCD:  Fact-
Specific Approaches to Wrap Enforceability 
Based on current precedent, the enforceability of click-wrap li-
censes appears to be a fact-specific determination, depending heav-
ily on the rules selected by the court in its analysis.127  Of the 
available means of ensuring the enforceability of electronic agree-
ments, paper agreements between the parties that govern the com-
munications are currently the safest way to proceed.128  The key is-
sues regarding wrap enforceability are whether the developer 
manifested an intention not to proceed unless the wrap terms were 
incorporated into the agreement.129  The issue is at what point, if 
any, during the transaction did the wrap license become a part of 
the contract,130 and whether federal copyright law preempts any of 
the license terms.131  A court’s view as to when contract formation 
takes place is crucial to determining how that court will rule on the 
second issue.132  A court treating post-sale terms as new or addi-
 
writing. 
U.C.C. § 2-201(1). 
125. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(1)) (“A contract for sale 
of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by 
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”). 
126. See id. at 1452-53; see also Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5. 
127. Cf. Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5 (noting “[there are] only a few cases 
addressing the issue of enforceability in rather fact-peculiar circumstances”). 
128. See Eisner, supra note 34, at 237. 
129. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d at 103-05; see also su-
pra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (stating the holding of Step-Saver). 
130. See Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. at 763-64; see 
also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (stating the holding of Arizona Retail). 
131. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d at 270; see also supra notes 
103-105 and accompanying text (discussing the issue raised in Vault). 
132. Cf. Christopher L. Pitet, The Problem With “Money Now, Terms Later”:  
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 
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tional terms to an already formed contract will likely not enforce 
additional click-wrap terms.133  A court treating the sale as condi-
tioned on assent to the license agreement, however, is likely to en-
force the agreement, especially if, as in ProCD, there are basic pro-
tections for the purchaser if he chooses to reject it.134 
Because of the fact-specific rulings and the paucity of cases, it 
appears premature to consider shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses 
categorically enforceable.135  The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, for example, applied a fact-
specific approach to rule against the enforceability of a shrink-
wrap term in Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys-
tems, Inc.136  Morgan involved a vendor who attempted to enforce 
a forum selection clause provided in a shrink-wrap license in-
cluded with the software, which the licensee had not agreed to in 
writing as required by the parties’ prior “no-modification-unless-
in-writing” agreement.137  In denying the vendor’s motions to dis-
miss for improper venue and transfer,138 the district court stated 
that although shrink-wrap agreements may be enforceable in some 
cases, they do not trump explicit prior agreements where those 
agreements contain integration and “no-modification-unless-in-
 
LOY. L.A. REV. 325, 340 (1997) (noting that in ProCD, the Seventh Circuit found that a 
contract was formed some time after the buyer was given an opportunity to read the li-
cense, and not at the time of purchase as prior courts had). 
133. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 655 (concluding that 
“because defendants did not have the opportunity to bargain or object to the proposed 
user agreement or even review it before purchase and they did not assent to the terms ex-
plicitly after they learned of them, they are not bound by the user agreement”). 
134. See Streff & Norman, supra note 8, at S6. 
135. See id.; see also D.C. Toedt III, Counterpoint:  Shrinkwrap License Enforce-
ability Issues, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 7, 9 (1996) (“Technically, the ProCD decision applies 
only to Wisconsin law, and is binding only in the federal district courts supervised by the 
Seventh Circuit.”). 
136. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1850 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
137. Id. at 1851.  The contract read in relevant part:  “This Agreement and the Li-
cense Agreement for the System are the entire agreement between the MDBS and the Li-
censee regarding the subject matter; no verbal representations are binding; any amend-
ment must be signed by MDBS and Licensee.”  Id. 
138. Id. at 1853 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).  Specifically, section 1404(a) of title 
28 of the United States Code states:  “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (West 1998). 
HARRISON.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1998] JUST CLICK HERE:  MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT 927 
writing clauses.”139 
Despite the uncertainty, ProCD, Step-Saver, and Arizona Retail 
Systems suggest certain steps that software developers may take to 
increase the likelihood that click-wrap licenses will be enforced.140  
Such steps include bringing the existence of the click-wrap license 
to the purchaser’s attention before concluding the sale, providing 
the purchaser with an opportunity to carefully review the license 
and decline to accept the software, and enabling the consumer to 
obtain a refund if the license is objectionable.141 
5. Hotmail:  A Sea Change in Click-Wrap Enforcement or 
Another Fact-Specific Ruling? 
The next step in click-wrap license enforcement could come 
from a yet-to-be-completed case in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia.  In Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc.,142 the district 
court found that a click-wrap agreement was so likely to be en-
forced that it met the strict test for a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent a breach.  Hotmail, a California e-mail provider, sued for 
trademark dilution, computer fraud, and breach of its click-wrap 
prohibition against “spam”—unsolicited commercial e-mail similar 
to postal junk mail.143  In ruling that Hotmail was likely to prevail 
on its breach of contract claim,144 the court equated the click-wrap 
agreement with a traditional contract.145 
Nevertheless, Hotmail’s impact on future click-wrap enforce-
 
139. See Morgan, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1853 (citing Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 
763-66). 
140. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5. 
141. See id. 
142. No. C-98-20064, 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (BNA) (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 16, 1998) (order). 
143. Id. at *1. 
144. Id. at *6. 
145. In ruling that Hotmail was likely to prevail on its click-wrap enforcement 
claim, the court ruled that: 
The evidence supports a finding that . . . defendants agreed to abide by Hot-
mail’s Terms of Service . . . that defendants breached their contract with Hot-
mail . . . that Hotmail complied with the conditions of the contract except those 
from which its performance was excused . . . and that if defendants are not en-
joined they will continue . . . in violation of the Terms of Service. 
Id. at *6. 
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ment is clouded by the presence of numerous other claims against 
the defendants.  Although there is no way of knowing the weight 
the court attributed to the click-wrap enforcement claim, it seems 
unlikely that it was the most important cause of action—given that 
the litigation also alleged violation of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act146 and violations of the Lanham Act for trademark dilu-
tion147 and false designation.148  Consequently, Hotmail could sig-
nal a sea change in click wrap enforcement by the courts, or, if in 
fact the click-wrap breach was merely an afterthought by the court, 
Hotmail could join the ranks of the extremely fact-specific rulings 
on click-wrap enforceability. 
II. PROPOSED ARTICLE 2B OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The lack of uniformity in the caselaw prompted the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has to form 
a committee to draft a new article 2B in the U.C.C.149 to govern 
transactions in the computer industry, including licenses.150  The 
committee, comprised of representatives from computer software, 
consumer, and entertainment groups, has met numerous times 
since March 1994.151  Article 2B would supersede the proposed 
U.C.C. provision discussed by the district court in ProCD.152 
Article 2B deals with transactions in information.153  It focuses 
on transactions relating to the “copyright industries,” including 
computer software contracts.154  It is intended to create a uniform 
body of law that would apply to transactions in software, including 
retail software transactions such as shrink-wrap and click-wrap li-
 
146. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 105-175 (May 11, 
1998)) (barring knowing accessed to a computer without authorization or exceeding au-
thorized access). 
147. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 1998). 
148. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1998). 
149. U.C.C. 2B pt. 1 (Draft September 25, 1997). 
150. See id. preface. 
151. See id. pt. 1. 
152. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 655 (W.D. Wis. 1996), 
rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 87-87 and accompanying text 
(discussing the district court’s use of proposed section 2-2203 in its analysis of why 
shrink-wraps were unenforceable under then current law). 
153. U.C.C. 2B preface. 
154. Id. 
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censes.155  The draft presents new means of contract adapted to 
electronic contract formation.156  For example, a “record” replaces 
the traditional “writing” requirements, “authentication” replaces 
the traditional signature requirements, and programmed electronic 
“agents” may form a contract even though there is no actual review 
by the parties of the terms of their agreement.157 
The movement to amend article 2 arose broadly out of the need 
to create a new U.C.C. provision to cover the American economy’s 
shift from a goods-based economy to one rooted in information, as 
illustrated by the growth of on-line contracting.158  More narrowly, 
the article 2-amendment process resulted from the software indus-
try’s concerns over the contradictory decisions regarding the en-
forceability of shrink-wrap agreements159 and consumer group de-
sires for greater protections.160  Among the central goals of the 
article 2B drafting committee are creation of a balanced structure 
for electronic contracting, reduction uncertainty and non-
uniformity in software and on-line contract law, and confirmation 
of freedom in commercial transactions.161 
One of the greatest challenges facing the drafters of article 2B 
is the need to strike a proper balance between the vendor’s re-
quirement for post-sale terms in mass-market licenses and the dan-
ger they pose to unwary consumers.162  Post-sale terms are particu-
 
155. See Streff & Norman, supra note 8, at S6. 
156. U.C.C. 2B pt. 3. 
157. Streff & Norman, supra note 8. 
158. U.C.C. 2B pt. 1. 
159. See infra Part I.B (discussing the shrink-wrap cases leading up to ProCD). 
160. See Ed Foster, Software Industry has Little Incentives, INFOWORLD, Apr. 7, 
1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 10395347.  According to Mark Nebergall, vice 
president and counsel for the Software Publishers Association: 
When the [Software Publishers Association] first got involved in this three or 
so years ago, the thing our members wanted to see most was some certainty in 
the law regarding enforcement of our license agreements . . . .  There were 
some cases at that point that cast some uncertainty on the enforceability of 
some provisions.  But things have changed. 
Id. 
161. See U.C.C. 2B, preface. 
162. Cf. Darren C. Baker, ProCD v. Zeidenberg:  Commercial Reality, Flexibility in 
Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Li-
censes, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 379, 381 (1997) (noting that “[w]hile the court’s decision in 
ProCD is correct, courts wishing to apply the decision should limit the holding to its facts 
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larly important for electronic databases because such information 
easily can be copied and distributed over the Internet.163  Given 
this situation, developers are unlikely to expend significant time 
and money to develop and market such products without effective 
contractual protections.164  The final draft of U.C.C. article 2B will 
be all the more important given the lack of state legislation on 
Internet commercial issues.165 
A. Definition of Terms:  Section 2B-102 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
Under section 2B-102(a)(7), “conspicuous,” when applied to a 
term or terms, means “written, displayed or presented [so] that a 
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have no-
ticed it . . . .”166  Under subsections (A) through (E), a term is con-
spicuous if it is (1) in all capitals, displayed in larger or contrasting 
color than other language in the record; (2) prominently referenced 
in the body or text and can be readily accessed; (3) positioned so 
that the user cannot proceed without taking action with respect to 
the term; or (4) readily distinguishable in any other way.167 
Under section 2B-107(a)(28), a “mass-market” license is a de-
fined as a standard form that is prepared for and used in a “mass-
market transaction.”168  Under subsection (29), “mass-market 
transactions” are “transactions in a retail market involving infor-
mation directed to the general public as a whole under substantially 
the same terms for the same information, and involving an end-
user licensee . . . consistent with an ordinary transaction in the 
general retail distribution.”169  That covers the typical click-wrap 
 
thereby ensuring the proper balance between consumer protection and the freedom of 
software manufacturers to protect their products with the use of contract”). 
163. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5. 
164. See id. 
165. See also Koh Su Haw, E-commerce:  Technology Can Bypass the Legal Pit-
falls, BUS. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 6288344 (noting 
that “existing laws . . . are [not] equipped to handle the vastly different Internet commu-
nications medium”). 
166. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(7) (Draft Sept. 25, 1997). 
167. Id. § 2B-102(a)(7)(A)-(E). 
168. Id. § 2B-102(a)(28). 
169. Id. 
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agreement because such agreements consist of the same terms for 
the use of information directed to the general public through the 
Internet, and an end-user license consistent with software retail 
purchases.170 
B. Manifestation of Assent:  Section 2B-212 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
Section 2B-112, in conjunction with section 2B-113, attempts to 
create a procedural background for manifestation of assent in order 
to provide consumers with protections against inadvertent and un-
knowing assent.171  Section 2B-112 provides that a contract is not 
enforceable unless the consumer agrees or manifests assent.172  As-
sent requires an opportunity to review and affirmative conduct, not 
mere retention without objection.173 
Manifestation of assent differs in operation from traditional con-
tract offer and acceptance.174  Under the common law, offer and ac-
ceptance create a contract.175  Under article 2B, objective manifesta-
tions of assent bind a party to a term or to the terms of a record if 
there was an opportunity to review the record and the party takes an 
affirmative act or manifests conduct that indicates consent.176 
The Reporter’s Notes to section 2B-212 list three elements that 
are required for manifestation of assent.177  First, the party manifest-
ing assent must be one that can bind the licensor being charged with 
providing the benefits or limitations of the terms of the record and, 
where assent equals acceptance, the contract itself.178  Second, the 
assenting party must take an affirmative act.179  In traditional trans-
actions for the sale of goods, a signature manifests assent to a record 
and initials attached to a particular clause manifest assent to that 
 
170. See id. 
171. Id. § 2B-112 n.1. 
172. Id. app. A. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. n.2. 
175. See supra notes 42-77 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of con-
tract formation and general contract principles). 
176. U.C.C. § 2B-112 n.2. 
177. Id. n.3. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
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clause.180  Under article 2B, the affirmative act of clicking on a dis-
played button in response to an on-screen description constitutes ac-
ceptance of a particular term or an entire contract.181  Third, the as-
sent must come after a party had an opportunity to review the record 
or term.182  Contractual assent requires proof that the party actually 
read the terms to which it assents.183  “Opportunity to review,” in 
contrast, requires that the term or record be called to the party’s at-
tention before the actions occur.184  The terms do not have to all be 
in a single record for the requirement to be met, provided the loca-
tion creates an opportunity to review and the requirements of ex-
plicit consent are met.185  Thus, a hyper-linked reference to a li-
cense, actually contained in a different record, would satisfy the 
third element enunciated in the Reporter’s Notes to section 2B-
212.186 
The illustrations in the notes to section 2B-212 make clear that 
one way in which a consumer may manifest assent is by clicking 
on a box on a screen that states that he or she accepts the terms of 
the license.187  The illustrations in the current draft do not include, 
however, any examples of the more traditional case in retail pur-
chases, in which a consumer manifests assent by failing to reject 
the shrink-wrap license after opening a box that states on the out-
side that it is subject to the enclosed license.188  A similar problem 
arises with click-wrap agreements when the terms are provided 
only after clicking “O.K.” where the license is hyper-linked and 
not readily provided to the consumer prior to assent, or where the 
license terms are provided but the consumer must scroll through 
many pages in order to read the important warranty disclaimers in 
the agreement.189  The Reporter’s Notes to section 2B-212 state 
 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See id.  But see supra notes 68-68 and accompanying text (discussing the duty 
to read and its exception). 
184. U.C.C. § 2B-112 n.3. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. at 72-77. 
187. See id. n.3, illus. 1. 
188. See id. illus. 1-3. 
189. For an example of a subscriber license agreement requiring a user to scroll 
down in order to read it, visit N.Y. Times On-Line Website (visited May 3, 1998) 
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that a hyper-linked reference to a license contained in a different 
record gives the consumer sufficient opportunity to review assum-
ing all other conditions are met.190  It is unclear, however, whether 
this means article 2B endorses a failure to reject the license as a 
means of consumer assent to the terms.191 
C. Opportunity to Review Under Section 2B-213 and Limits on 
Wrap Enforceability Under Sections 2B-208 and 2B-104 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code 
Section 2B-213(a) provides that a consumer is deemed to have 
an opportunity to review for the purposes of assent if the term “is 
made available in a manner to call attention of the party and to 
permit review of its terms or enable the electronic agent to react to 
the record or term.”192  Section 2B-212(a) makes opportunity to 
review a prerequisite to manifestation of assent.193  If the terms are 
not provided for review until after the fee is paid, then under sec-
tion 2B-113(b) the opportunity to review requires a “right to a re-
fund of any contract fees paid or to stop any payment already initi-
ated if [the consumer] refuses the terms, discontinues use, and 
returns all copies.”194 
Section 2B-208 provides some narrow restrictions on the en-
forceability of wrap licenses.195  Pursuant to section 2B-208(c), a 
court may exclude a term under section 2B-208(a)(1)196 if it finds 
 
<http://www.nytimes.com/subscribe/sub-bin/new_sub.cgi/html>. 
190. See U.C.C. § 2B-212 n.3. 
191. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5-6. 
192. U.C.C. § 2B-113(a). 
193. See id. § 2B-112(a).  Section 2B-212(a) provides:  “(a) A party or electronic 
agent manifests assent to a record or term in a record if, with knowledge of the terms or 
after having an opportunity to review the record or term under Section 2B-113 . . . .”  Id. 
194. Id. § 2B-113(b).  But see Pitet, supra note 132, at 340-48 (concluding “money 
now, terms later” in wrap contracts is unfair and inconsistent with established legal prin-
ciples). 
195. U.C.C. § 2B-208. 
196. Id.  Specifically, section 2B-208(a) provides: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-209, a party adopts the terms of 
a mass-market license for purposes of Section 2B-207(a) if the party agrees, in-
cluding by manifesting assent, to the license before or in connection with the 
initial performance or use of or access to the information.  However, except as 
otherwise provided in this section, a term [for which there was no opportunity 
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the term “bizarre or oppressive by industry standards or commer-
cial practices.”197  Section 2B-104(b)(3) also makes clear that a 
court may exclude a term that is unenforceable due to failure to 
meet other express requirements of article 2B, such as the require-
ment of conspicuous language.198 
III. MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT:  DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT 
ARTICLE 2B DRAFT 
The most crucial issue in determining the enforceability of 
click-wrap agreements is ascertaining how a consumer manifests 
assent to click-wrap terms.  Under article 2B as it stands, authenti-
cation or signing is one method of manifesting assent, but assent 
may also be manifested by the licensee’s actions.199  In setting out 
what constitutes manifestation of assent, the current draft fails to 
sufficiently protect the first time Internet user, and those users un-
familiar with license terms. 
The “reasonable person” test as to what constitutes conspicu-
ous language presented in section 2B-102(a)(7) is particularly 
problematic.200  Greater linguistic precision is in order for the “rea-
sonable person” standard because the level of computer knowledge 
among Internet users varies greatly from seasoned computer pro-
fessionals to those who have just purchased their first computers 
and are making their inaugural attempts to log onto the Internet.  It 
stands to reason that the novice user is unlikely to be cognizant of 
click-wrap terms and those attached by hyperlink.  Therefore, 
 
to review before payment of the contract fee is not adopted and] does not be-
come part of the contract if the party does not know of or manifest assent to the 
particular term and the term creates an obligation or imposes a limitation that: 
    (1) the party proposing the form should know would cause an ordinary 
reasonable person acquiring this type of information in the general mass 
market to refuse the license if that party knew that the license contained 
the particular term; or 
    (2) conflicts with the negotiated terms of the agreement between the 
parties to the license. 
Id. 
197. Id. § 2B-208(c). 
198. Id. § 2B-104(b)(3). 
199. See id. § 2B-101. 
200. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (reviewing section 2B-
102(a)(7)). 
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those consumers may be unable to review the terms as envisioned 
by section 2B-213201 prior to manifesting assent.202 
Section 2B-102’s current “reasonable person standard” for 
what constitutes conspicuous terms203 is too broad, lacking suffi-
cient protection for novice computer users who lack experience 
with on-line contracts.  The conspicuous standard should be 
amended to terms that a minimally competent computer user 
would notice in order to place due emphasis on the problem of the 
first time computer user.  This is a unique problem to on-line con-
tract law, because all persons have at least minimal everyday ex-
perience with contracts for the sale of goods covered by article 2. 
A. Subjective Versus Objective:  Conflicting Approaches to 
Contractual Assent 
Article 2B rejects the subjective assent model and relies on ob-
jective assent.204  The Reporter for the Article 2B Revisions points 
out that the subjective assent approach does not reflect real life 
commercial or consumer practices as most agreements are not fully 
negotiated or read.205  Although the subjective assent approach 
would likely require an agreement executed by signature for on-
line services and is thus not practical, article 2B should strive to 
replicate the assurances inherent in subjective assent.206 
The “objective assent” model assumes the consumer has a duty 
to read and understand the contract.207  The objective assent ap-
proach views assent as an act that demonstrates, generally, one’s 
 
201. See supra Part II.C (discussing section 2B-213’s opportunity to review provi-
sion). 
202. See supra Part II.B (discussing section 2B-212’s manifestation of assent provi-
sion). 
203. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (discussing section 2B-102’s 
provision for conspicuous terms). 
204. See generally supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing the con-
flict between subjective and objective approaches to contractual assent). 
205. See Tito, supra note 64, at 22. 
206. Cf. id. (noting that the subjective approach is not useful for the servicewrap 
because it would likely require an agreement executed by the customer with language to 
the effect that by its signature, the customer verifies it has read and understood, and as-
sents to all provisions of the agreement). 
207. Id. 
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assent to the contract.208  Such manifestation of assent is deemed to 
be assent to all of the contract terms, whether or not they are read 
and understood.209 
Article 2B’s heavy reliance on the objective approach suffers 
infirmities when applied to the newly developed click-wrap 
agreement and Internet medium.210  Under section 2B-212, click-
wrap is generally enforceable if the licensee “manifests assent” to 
the license before or within a reasonable time after beginning to 
use the information, provided that the licensee had an “opportunity 
to review” the terms of the license before the licensee manifested 
assent.211  The key problem here is that the statute does not require 
that the licensee actually review the click-wrap terms; only an op-
portunity to review is required.212 
Click-wrap licenses typically involve important warranty dis-
claimers and forum selection clauses about which consumers must 
 
208. See id. 
209. See Tito, supra note 64, at 22. 
210. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing article 2B’s use of the 
objectivist approach). 
211. See Tito, supra note 64, at 22. 
212. See U.C.C. § 2B-112 (Draft Sept. 25, 1997).  Specifically, section 2B-112 pro-
vides: 
(a) A party or electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term in a record 
if, with knowledge of the terms or after having an opportunity to review the re-
cord or term under Section 2B-113, it: 
    (1) authenticates the record or term, or engages in other affirmative 
conduct or operations that the record conspicuously provides or the cir-
cumstances, including the terms of the record, clearly indicate will consti-
tute acceptance of the record or term; and 
    (2) had an opportunity to decline to authenticate the record or term or 
engage in the conduct. 
. . . . 
(b) The mere retention of information or a record without objection is not a 
manifestation of assent. 
(c) If assent to a particular term in addition to assent to a record is required, a 
party’s conduct does not manifest assent to that term unless there was an oppor-
tunity to review the term and the authentication or conduct relates specifically 
to the term. 
(d) A manifestation of assent may be proved in any manner, including by a 
showing that a procedure existed by which a party or an electronic agent must 
have engaged in conduct or operations that manifests assent to the contract or 
term in order to proceed further in the use it made of the information. 
Id. 
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be informed so they can make educated purchasing decisions be-
fore proceeding.213  Instead of permitting a click on an “O.K.” but-
ton to be sufficient affirmative conduct indicating manifestation of 
assent,214 article 2B should require more substantial consumer acts 
to assure assent to click-wrap terms.215 
B. Article 2B Assent Problems Applied to the Common Click-
Wrap Agreement 
The most recent draft of article 2B provides an instructive illus-
tration as to how a customer manifests assent to the New York Times 
On-Line click-wrap agreement.216  In the site’s pre-registration file, 
the New York Times On-Line provides, “Please read the license.  
Click here to read the License.  If you agree to the terms of the li-
cense, indicate your agreement by clicking the ‘I agree’ button.  If 
you do not agree to the license, click on the ‘I decline’ button.”217  
The user is presented with a hypertext link that, if selected, displays 
the license. 
Under section 2B-212, a party who clicks “I agree” manifests 
assent to the license.218  Additionally, moving forward to use the 
information resource would also indicate acceptance of the offer 
for a contract.219  The current draft fails to adequately address 
some potential problems that may arise out of this common click-
wrap agreement. 
The first problem regards the related issues of mistake and a 
lack of psychological commitment by the consumer.220  Although 
 
213. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussing typical warranty dis-
claimers and forum selection clauses in click-wrap agreements). 
214. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing section 2B-212’s ap-
proval of clicking a box as means of manifesting assent). 
215. See infra Part III.C (noting methods of obtaining a greater psychological com-
mitment on the part of the consumer in manifesting assent to click-wrap terms). 
216. See U.C.C. § 2B-112 n.3. 
217. Id.  To see the actual New York Times on-line subscriber agreement, visit the 
N.Y. Times On-Line Website (visited May 3, 1998) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/subscribe/sub-bin/new_sub.cgi/html>. 
218. U.C.C. § 2B-112 n.3. 
219. See id. 
220. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective and 
objective approaches to contract formation). 
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it is unlikely that a consumer in an article 2 transaction would ac-
cidentally pay for a product and take it home from the store, with 
an article 2B transaction all it takes is an accidental click on 
“O.K.” to bind the consumer to the click-wrap terms.221  Because 
software services are not tangible goods and because assent gives 
the user access to information only, the consumer may not be 
aware that a mistake has occurred.  A completed on-line transac-
tion does not afford the same level of perceptual impact on the 
consumer as a goods transaction.  For similar reasons, Internet 
transactions, as currently constructed, fail to attain sufficient psy-
chological commitment on the part of the user.  Free trial member-
ships and attractive facades encourage users to click “O.K.” and 
neglect the click-wrap terms.222  The interactive nature of the 
Internet invites users to click on to the next page.  A consumer who 
quickly provides her personal information and clicks “O.K.” by-
passes the license terms that the New York Times will seek to en-
force.223  Here, the consumer’s lack of subjective intent to agree to 
the license agreement is hidden behind her computer interface. 
The second problem regards the manifestation of assent with 
click-wrap agreements in cases where the consumer is made aware 
of the terms only after clicking “O.K.”224  With respect to a license 
provided after acceptance, section 2B-213 does provide for a re-
fund if the license is refused.225  Issues of timing may arise, how-
ever, with respect to the customer’s rights in this regard. 
 
221. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing the process by which 
click-wrap contracts are formed). 
222. See, e.g., Netscape Website (visited May 2, 1998) 
<http://www.home.netscape.com/download/index.html#list.html> (displaying a colorful 
exclamation point followed by a hyperlinked offer to “[g]et the latest version of Netscape 
web browser Software”); see also GATES, supra note 1 (stating that vendors will find 
ways to entice consumers on the Internet). 
223. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussing typical wrap terms). 
224. See supra notes 172-174, 193 and accompanying text (noting that under sec-
tions 2B-212 and 2B-213, only manifestation of assent combined with an opportunity to 
review the terms is necessary for a consumer to assent to click-wrap terms). 
225. See U.C.C. § 2B-213 n.2 (Draft Sept. 25, 1997).  Note 2 of the Reporter’s 
Notes to 2B-213 specifically states, “[u]nder this section, the opportunity to review can 
come at or before payment, or later.  If the opportunity follows payment, there is no oppor-
tunity to review unless the party can return the product an receive a refund if it declines the 
terms of the record.”  Id. 
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The telephone service lines of many Internet service providers 
lack sufficient capacity to handle the flow of member calls, thus 
requiring a consumer to wait a significant amount of time for assis-
tance.226  The charge against the member’s credit card may be still 
running during this time.  Furthermore, some Internet service pro-
viders do not provide immediate termination of on-line contracts, 
requiring the customer to be bound until the end of the next billing 
cycle.227  The essential question is whether consumers are truly 
able to withdraw their consent to objectionable click-wrap terms 
based on the current prevailing practices of Internet service pro-
viders.  Even with the refund provision in section 2B-213,228 the 
safeguard can be ineffective.  The refund provision also raises the 
issue of whether consumers would actually return software after 
having purchased and used it upon learning of unfavorable terms in 
the license agreement.229 
The third problem arises when a party lacking legal capacity, 
such as child younger than eighteen, clicks acceptance.  Under a 
common law goods transaction, such a contract is voidable by the 
infant or by his heirs, administrators, or executors.230  In the Inter-
net context, however, the Internet service provider may attempt to 
hold liable the parent whose name is listed as the member on the 
service—merely because her child clicked a mouse or computer 
keyboard.231  Based on children’s tremendous access Internet,232 
 
226. See, e.g., Long Wait for Technical Support Hard on the Nerves, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Sept. 22, 1996 (describing problems that computer users seeking computer help 
over the phone face, including “[j]ammed telephone lines and harried support techni-
cians”). 
227. Telephone Interview with Prodigy Classic Member Services (Oct 10, 1997). 
228. See U.C.C. § 2B-113. 
229. Cf. Lemley I, supra note 13, at 1294 n.47 (“Because a purchaser has made a 
decision to buy a particular product and has actually obtained the product, the purchaser 
may use it despite the refund offer, regardless of the additional terms specific after the 
contract formed.”) (quoting Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech. and Software Link, 
Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
230. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 44, § 8-2, at 306-07; see also supra note 
57 and accompanying text (discussing that infant contracts are either void or voidable). 
231. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing section 2B-212’s ap-
proval of clicking a box as means of manifesting assent). 
232. See, e.g., PC-Savvy Kids Moving to the Web, INTERACTIVE HOME, Apr. 1, 
1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 9639932 (noting that “[t]he number of children 
actively using the Internet and online services during 1996 increased significantly over 
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the U.C.C. drafting committee must address this problem in future 
drafts. 
Finally, a potential problem arises with attempts to execute 
contracts requiring signatures by state statute on-line.  Article 2B 
attempts to address this issue through section 2B-104.233  It is de-
batable whether such contracts can be executed on-line.  Under 
section 2B-104, state statutes requiring a writing take priority over 
conflicting provisions of article 2B.234  In the absence of an appli-
cable state statute, parties may need to use digital signatures or 
download, sign, and transmit by fax or mail documents containing 
written signatures, as is customarily done in connection with cer-
tain on-line securities transactions.235  An explicit demarcation of 
rules is in order for on-line contracts in states devoid of statutory 
guidelines. 
C. Suggested Means of Obtaining Greater Psychological 
Commitment on the Part of the Consumer 
A significant group of commentators has questioned the valid-
ity of shrink-wrap licenses, primarily because software users do 
not have an opportunity to bargain over their terms.236  Even if the 
 
that of 1995”). 
233. See U.C.C. § 2B-104(b)(5) (Draft Sept. 25, 1997).  Specifically section 2B-
104(b)(5) provides: 
(b) If a law of this State existing on the effective date of this article applies to a 
transaction governed by this article, the following rules apply: 
 . . . . 
 (5) A statute authorizing electronic or digital signatures, or authorizing 
electronic or digital substitutes for requirements of a writing controls over 
the provisions of this article to the extent of a conflict with this article. 
Id. 
234. See id. 
235. See Ballon, supra note 35, at 30 n.30. 
236. See Lemley I, supra note 13; Moore & Hadden, supra note 87; Ramos & Ver-
don, supra note 11; David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 
SOFTWARE L.J. 401 (1992) (concluding shrink-wrap licenses are unlikely to be enforced 
under contract law); Gary Hamilton & Jeffrey Hood, The Shrink-Wrap License:  Is it 
Really Necessary?, 9 COMPUTER L. 16 (1993) (stating that shrink-wrap licenses are un-
necessary to enforce intellectual property law and undesirable otherwise); David L. 
Hayes, Shrinkwrap License Agreements:  New Light on a Vexing Problem, 9 COMPUTER 
L. 1 (1992) (noting that shrink-wrap licenses are unlikely to be enforced under section 2-
207); Thomas Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal 
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consumer browses through the agreement before clicking, the typi-
cal consumer will not become aware of any disclaimers of warran-
ties until the software has been purchased and something goes 
wrong.237  Many consumers fail to read the licenses because once 
they install the software, they act on the reflexive impulse to click 
“O.K.” to any agreement that is posted.238  It is difficult to say that 
clicking “O.K.” constitutes a “meeting of the minds” sufficient to 
indicate contractual assent, because the purchaser might be simply 
making an irrational act, devoid of psychological commitment.239  
Under the logic of the Wisconsin District Court in ProCD, an on-
line user who clicks “I agree,” but does not scroll down to see the 
terms of the agreement, could be viewed as having not consented 
to the terms.240 
Consumer advocates voice strong concerns about this prob-
lem.241  An on-line contract regime that successfully protects con-
 
Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994) (maintaining 
that shrink-wraps are an attempt to return to feudal controls on the alienability of prop-
erty); David W. Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License:  Old Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 292 (1987) (stating that equitable servitude law is inadequate to ad-
dress problems of shrink-wrap licensing); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of 
Mass Marketed Software:  Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51, 53 (1985) (proposing separate U.C.C. provisions for soft-
ware to decide which terms in shrink-wrap licenses are reasonable and should be en-
forced); Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State “Shrink-Wrap” License 
Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 235 
n.92 (1988) (noting that laws validating shrink-wrap licenses are preempted by federal 
copyright law); James Peys, Note, Commercial Law—The Enforceability of Computer 
“Box-Top” License Agreements Under the U.C.C., 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 881 (1985) (argu-
ing that shrink-wrap licenses should not be enforceable). 
237. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (stating that under section 2B-212 
and 2B-213 only manifestation of assent combined with an opportunity to review the 
terms is necessary for a consumer to assent to click-wrap terms). 
238. Cf. supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that consumers are in a dif-
ferent frame of mind with respect to license terms after leaving the store with the soft-
ware). 
239. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (addressing the subjective ap-
proach’s “meeting of the minds” concept); see also Ballon, supra note 35, at 17 (stating 
that because information travels quickly through the Internet, people take less care in 
what they write, and their statements, typed in the heat of passion, are electronically 
stored). 
240. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text (discussing the Wisconsin 
District Court’s grounds for finding ProCD’s shrink-wrap license unenforceable). 
241. See Lisa Picarille, License Law May Limit Liability Software Contracts May 
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sumers must bridge the gap between the consumer’s purchasing 
mode and the consumer’s need to take advantage of the opportu-
nity to review the license terms.  In essence, it must force consum-
ers to wake up and take notice of the terms they are agreeing to be-
fore clicking on “O.K.” 
One way to solidify the consumer’s acceptance of click-wrap 
terms would be to require the consumer to type in an affirmative 
statement, such as “I assent to the terms of the license agreement,” 
in order to signify binding assent to the license terms.  Another 
possibility would be for the click-wrap page to have a clause that 
says, “in order to signify that you agree to be bound by the forego-
ing terms, please type in the following code.”  The act of typing in 
actual words of assent or a code, as opposed to merely clicking on 
“O.K.,” would force the consumer to give more thought to the 
terms of the agreement.242  Such acceptance would create a closer 
approximation of the “bargain” between offeror and offeree envi-
sioned by modern contract law.243  Certainly, those positive acts 
would be a much clearer form of acceptance than the buyer refrain-
ing from returning the software as suggested by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.244  The current prevailing 
method of acceptance by clicking on “O.K.” sanctioned by article 
2B does not have sufficient psychological impact on the licen-
see.245  Pursuant to sections 2B-312 and 2B-313, an additional 
safeguard for the customer would be the placement of a warning 
 
Threaten User Recourse, COMPUTERWORLD, May 12, 1997, at 1.  Todd Paglia, a staff 
lawyer for the Consumer Project on Technology at the Center for the Study of Respon-
sive Law, stated that “[t]he licenses are postsale, and consumers are in a different mode.  
Buying is one decision, and getting the software home and installing it is a different deci-
sion . . . .”  Id. 
242. Cf. Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Ariz. 
1993) (“ARS . . . accepted TSL’s offer on TSL’s terms when the envelope was opened.”) 
(emphasis added). 
243. See supra notes 58-59 (discussing the bargain theory of contracts). 
244. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding arbitration 
clause included with personal computer was enforceable, and deemed accepted, because 
plaintiffs failed to return computer within thirty day limit set forth in contract; and disclo-
sure of full terms is not required as part of telephone sale unless buyer specifically re-
quests warranty information). 
245. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing article 2B’s manifesta-
tion of assent provision). 
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surrounding the click-wrap agreement, providing conspicuous and 
explicit instructions, telling consumers who enter the web site how 
to assent or decline additional terms.246 
Article 2B also should encourage click-wrap licensors to take 
steps to make it technologically impossible for a user to access the 
material offered by a site unless the consumer has indicated assent 
to the license before the software is downloaded.247  The current 
draft falls short of requiring such a safeguard248 by actually validat-
ing click-wrap contracts under which the terms are provided after 
the user’s agreement through section 2B-213’s refund provision.249  
A technological impediment would protect both consumer rights 
and vendor intellectual property rights.250  Without such a restric-
tion, it is conceivable that a potential user could download and 
copy software before reading the license and then reject the license 
and return the software.251  Under such a scenario, the vendor has 
no assurance that the user will delete the software from his com-
puter if he decides to return it.252  In light of the current lack of 
 
246. Cf. infra note 253 and accompanying text (noting the need for conspicuous 
terms to improve the likelihood of click-wrap enforceability). 
247. See Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in the On-line World, 14 
COMPUTER LAW. 1, 5 (1997).  Specifically, Grogan notes: 
[A] Web site host could block direct access to Web pages other than its home-
page, and require, as a condition to permitting any user to follow a link to any 
subsequent page, that the user first read the terms of a license agreement impos-
ing limitations and restrictions on use and distribution of materials appearing 
on the Web site, and that the user click on a button or icon evidencing the 
user’s consent to those terms. 
Id. 
248. See U.C.C. § 2B-112(a)(2)(d) (Draft Sept. 25, 1997).  Section 2B-112(a)(2)(d) 
provides: 
A manifestation of assent may be proved in any manner, including by a show-
ing that a procedure existed by which a party or an electronic agent must have 
engaged in conduct or operations that manifests assent to the contract or term in 
order to proceed further in the use it made of the information. 
Id. 
249. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (discussing section 2B-213’s 
validation of contracts where terms are provided following payment provided the con-
sumer has the right to a refund). 
250. See Baker, supra note 162, at 411 (discussing the need for ProCD to prevent 
copying in order to maintain price discrimination and keep prices reasonable for consum-
ers). 
251. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 11, at 5. 
252. See id. 
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firm legal precedent on click-wrap agreements, it is clear that, to 
increase the likelihood of license enforceability, licensors must be 
take significant steps to solidify the consumer’s assent.253 
CONCLUSION 
Article 2B presents a unique opportunity to apply contract 
principles to a new frontier of information-based commercial 
transactions.  The decisions made by the drafting committee will 
play a significant role in the growth and development of electronic 
commerce well into the next century.  But the draft’s current provi-
sions enforce click-wrap agreements without sufficient safeguards 
for inexperienced consumers or those who seek to withdraw assent.  
Article 2B must be amended to provide stronger guarantees of the 
consumer’s psychological commitment to be bound by the terms.  
While no perfect compromise exists between industry and con-
sumer concerns, the proposals advocated by this Note would give 
due consideration to consumer concerns without impinging on the 
software industry’s interest in enforceable contracts. 
 
253. See Eisner, supra note 34, at 238.  Eisner recommends that licensors: 
(a) Use methods to assure validity and authenticity of the communications, 
such as passwords, user IDs and encryption; (b) Present the terms to the user, 
and have the user accept the terms before the user gives consideration for the 
services; (c) Obtain something from the user that qualifies as a signature, 
and/or clearly manifests the user’s consent to the terms; (d) Use terms that are 
industry standard; (e) Make all terms, but especially unusual ones, conspicuous 
and clear to the user. 
Id. 
